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RECENT DECISIONS

When the United States is subject to the liabilities of a private
employer, 26 it should have the concomitant equitable rights of such
an employer. Appropriate legislation to accomplish this is necessary
to forestall the noted deleterious effects of this decision.

X
TORTS-PARENTAL IMMUNITY UPHELD IN

WRONGFUL DEATH

ACTION.-An unemancipated infant plaintiff sued his mother for the
wrongful death of his father caused by her negligent operation of an
automobile. The plaintiff contended that the Nevada wrongful death
statute, which does not expressly except suits by minors, directly repealed the common-law rule of immunity of a parent from suit by a
minor child. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed a summary
judgment for the defendant, holding that the wrongful death statute
did not abrogate the common-law rule. Strong v. Strong, 267 P.2d
240 (Nev. 1954).
Up to and including the latter part of the nineteenth century,
there was no rule declaring parents immune from tort actions by their
minor children.1 In 1891, the common-law rule establishing parental
immunity had its inception in the celebrated case of Hewellette v.
George.2 The Mississippi court, citing neither judicial precedent nor
text material, based its decision solely on the ground that public policy prohibited tort suits between parent and child. Thereafter, other
states adopted the rule, stating that maintenance of a suit by a child
against the parent would be disruptive of family harmony; 3 that
immunity should be extended to parents so as not to hamper their
disciplinary function; 4 that recovery by a child would result in a
depletion of the family resources to the detriment of the other children; ri and, that the child is sufficiently protected by the criminal
laws of the state from abuse at the hands of his parent. 6
The broad terms of the parental immunity rule have led to injustice. The most extreme application of this rule occurred in Roller
v. Roller,7 where a minor child was precluded from maintaining a
civil suit against her father who had raped her. The court para26 See note 1 supra.
1 See PROSsER, TORTS

905 (1941).
268 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); see PRossER, TORTS 905 (1941).
3 See Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923) ; Wick v. Wick,
192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
4 See Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932).
5 See Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
6 See Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Matarese
v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925).
7 See note 5 supra.
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doxically based its decision on domestic tranquility and declared that
departure from the rule in an extreme case would leave no practical
line of demarcation.8 It is not surprising, therefore, that later cases
have rejected the rigid application of the rule in the Roller case by
delimiting it with a variety of exceptions. Thus, suits were allowed
where wilful or malicious injuries have been inflicted by the parents 9
(rejecting the theory of the Roller case), and where the child is
emancipated. 10 Parental immunity has also been restricted to wrongs
occurring within the ordinary scope of domestic matters." Accordingly, there is no immunity when the child is injured by the parent
while the latter is engaged in his business or employment. 12 Moreover, where the injury to the child results from a wilful or malicious
act,13 or from excessive discipline, 14 some courts attach liability on
the theory that the parent is acting outside the parental relationship.
Indeed, a few states have rendered the parental immunity rule inapplicable where the parent is protected by liability insurance. 15 The
reasoning is that parental discipline and domestic harmony are not
offended where the recovery by the child is a loss, not to the father,
but to the insurance company. 16 However, other jurisdictions, in8The

court, in Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950), re-

ferring to the Roller case said, "It is absurd to talk about maintaining the peace
and tranquility of the home when it had thus already been disrupted by such
a monstrous crime." Id., 218 P.2d at 450.
9 See, e.g., Siembab v. Siembab, 202 Misc. 1053, 112 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup.
Ct. 1952); Meyer v. Ritterbush, 196 Misc. 551, 92 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct.
1949), aff'd mere., 276 App. Div. 972, 94 N.Y.S2d 620 (2d Dep't 1950).
10 See Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 2,47, 114 N.W. 763 (1908). "Emancipation may be the result of a voluntary agreement, express or implied, between the parent and child . . . ; enlistment of the minor in the military
service . . . ; abandonment or desertion by the parent . . . ; attainment of
majority .
; by marriage ......
4 BAYLOR L. REv. 249, 252 (1952).
1 See Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149, 156 (1952).
12 Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952) ; Borst v. Borst,
supra note 11.
13 See Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Cowgill v.
Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
14 See Cowgill v. Boock, supra note 13, 218 P.2d at 452.
15 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930) ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
16 "There is no reason for applying the rule [of parental immunity] in the
instant case [where the parent is protected by insurance]. This action is not
unfriendly as between the daughter and the father. A recovery by her is no
loss to him. In fact, their interests unite in favor of her recovery, but without
hint of 'domestic fraud and collusion' (charged in some cases). There is no
filial recrimination and no pitting of the daughter against the father in this
case. No strained family relations will follow. On the contrary, the daughter
must honor the father for attempting to provide compensation against her misfortune. Family harmony is assured instead of disrupted. A wrong is righted
instead of 'privileged.'" Lusk v. Lusk, szipra note 15, 166 S.E. at 539. See
McNiece and Thornton, Is The Law Of Negligence Obsolete?, 26 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 255, 265 (1952).
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cluding New York, take a contrary position, reasoning that the presence of insurance ". . . creates no right to sue where one otherwise
would not exist." 17
In the present case the child sued through his guardian ad litem
as a beneficiary under the Nevada wrongful death statute. Such an
action is derivative solely because it is dependent upon a right of action in the decedent. It arises out of, and is founded upon, the same
wrong that has been done to him, that is, the death itself.' 8 Beyond
that, the injury to the beneficiary is separate and distinct from the
injury to the decedent.Y9 The damage to the beneficiary is not a
personal injury but rather the deprivation of support,20 a compensable
loss in the nature of a property right.21 Consequently, the Court, in
arriving at its decision by a process of statutory construction of the
Nevada wrongful death statute,2 2 has in effect applied the parental
immunity rule to an action based on a property right. Yet suits by
23
minors to vindicate property rights have never been disallowed,
nor were they prohibited by the rule of the Hewellette 24 case which
involved only personal injury. Thus, the courts have recognized
17 Siembab v. Siembab, 202 Misc. 1053, 112 N.Y.S.2d 82, 83 (Sup. Ct.
1952); see Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. 2d 677, 678-679 (D.C. Cir. 1948)
(applying Maryland law); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438
(1938). In the Villaret case the court gave additional reasons for not discarding the parental immunity rule where the parent is covered by liability insurance: "Such policies frequently contain a provision requiring the insured
to cooperate in the defense of any action brought against him. Compliance
with such a requirement might readily produce the domestic disharmony to
avoid which the rule was formulated. Moreover, to permit the maintenance
of a suit such as this because the parent has liability insurance would tend to
encourage collusive fraud between the child and parent in order to recover
against the insurer." Villaret v. Villaret, supra at 679.
18 See Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N.Y. 258, 267, 1 N.E. 787, 792 (1885).
19 Perry v. Tonopah Mining Co., 13 F.2d 865 (D. Nev. 1915); Estes v.
Riggins, 68 Nev. 336, 232 P.2d 843 (1951).
20 See Wells, Inc. v. Shoemake, 64 Nev. 57, 177 P.2d 451 (1947).
21 See Matter of Meekin v. The Brooklyn Heights R.R, 164 N.Y. 145, 58
N.E. 50 (1900); Matter of Weaver, 195 Misc. 405, 90 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Surr.
Ct. 1949). "Injuries suffered by the plaintiffs by the lessening of their estate
and the invasion and deprivation of their pecuniary interest and right to future
support from their decedent by the commission of the wrongful act is . . . a

destruction or injury to property ....

Where the courts have not held such

losses to be injuries to property, it has been due to a reluctance to depart from
ancient judicial declarations

.

.

. ."

Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288, 169 P.2d

913,22918 (1946).
However, in an action brought under the Pennsylvania wrongful death
statute, a minor child was permitted to recover against his mother. The court
held that since the statute did not expressly preclude a suit by a child against
its parent, such an action was maintainable. See Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa.
49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939).
23 See Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149, 153 (1952); see
PROSSER, ToRTs 905 (1941); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons It Domestic
Relation, 43 HArv. L. REv. 1030, 1057 (1930).
24 See note 2 supra.
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causes of action by minors against their parents to recover wages, 25
rent, 26 or money advanced to the parent. 27 It is submitted, therefore,
that the Court has made an unwarranted extension of the parental
immunity rule.

See Jine v. Jine, 226 S.W. 51 (St. Louis Ct. of Appeals 1920).
See Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895).
27 See Smith v. Smith, 38 Cal. App. 388, 176 Pac. 382 (1918) ; Jine v. Jine,
supra note 25.
25
26

